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Introduction and summary
One of the basic monetary policy issues facing the mo-
nopolist supplier of currency is what price to charge for
its use. The price paid for the use of currency, by house-
holds or firms, is the foregone interest on less liquid,
but riskless, assets such as short-term government
bonds. Thus, the question of what price to charge for
the use of currency is identified with the question of
what is the optimal nominal interest rate.
According to Friedman (1969), monetary policy
ought to be conducted so that the resulting nominal
interest on short-term, less liquid assets is zero. The
argument for the Friedman rule is very simple: Since
the cost of supplying money is negligible,1 the price
charged for its use should also be very close to zero.
The first best argument of Friedman (1969) was
challenged by Phelps (1973) on the basis that a posi-
tive nominal interest rate generates tax revenues for
the government. According to Phelps (1973), since the
alternative sources of revenue also create distortions,
liquidity should be taxed like any other good. This
public finance argument motivated a literature on the
optimal inflation tax in a second-best environment,
where the government is constrained to finance exoge-
nous government expenditures by recourse to distor-
tionary taxes. Somewhat surprisingly, the recent literature
on the optimal inflation tax has argued that, even in a
second-best environment, it is optimal not to use the
inflation tax, so that the Friedman rule is still optimal.
Why is this the case? Why shouldn’t liquidity be taxed
like any other good, as argued by Phelps (1973)?
In this article, I review some of the results ob-
tained in the literature on the optimality of the
Friedman rule. I base the analysis on Correia and
Teles (1996, 1999) and De Fiore and Teles (2003),
which have built on work by Kimbrough (1986),
Guidotti and Végh (1993), and Chari, Christiano,
and Kehoe (1996), among others.
I start by analyzing a simple environment where
liquidity services are modeled as a final good, so that
agents gain utility from consumption, leisure, and real
balances, measured by the stock of money deflated by
the price level. This is the context in which the argument
of Phelps (1973) was made. According to Phelps, an
application of the Ramsey (1927) principles of taxation
of final goods, would mean that tax distortions should
be distributed across goods, including liquidity services.
Since the public finance principles, such as Ramsey
(1927), were applied to costly goods, I allow for the
possibility that money is costly to supply. I assume that
the utility function satisfies the conditions for uniform
taxation of final goods, established by Atkinson and
Stiglitz (1972). In that case it is optimal to tax money,
at the same proportionate rate as the consumption good.
Thus, the price charged for the use of money, the nominal
interest rate, int, should be equal to the cost of produc-
ing real balances, c, marked up by the optimal com-
mon tax rate, τ*, on real balances and consumption,
int* = c(1 + τ*).
As the cost of producing money, c, is reduced, so
is the optimal price charged for the use of money, int*.
When the cost is zero, c = 0, the optimal nominal in-
terest rate is also zero,
int* = 0.
Thus, even if the optimal proportionate tax on
money is positive and relatively high, because the pro-
duction costs of money are very small, the optimal price
charged for money and therefore the implicit unit tax30 2Q/2003, Economic Perspectives
may also be very small. In this case, it is clear that the
reason for the optimality of the Friedman rule is the
fact that money is costless.
Since real balances measure the purchasing power
of money, it is more appropriate to use, as its measure,
the stock of money deflated by the price level gross of
consumption taxes, rather than net of these taxes. The
reason for this is that the consumption taxes are typical-
ly paid using the same means of payment as that used to
purchase the consumption goods. A small modification
of the model described above considers this measure
of real balances. The fact that money balances are de-
flated by the price level gross of taxes implies that the
price paid for the use of real balances is now the nomi-
nal interest rate marked up by the consumption tax. Un-
der the conditions for uniform taxation, in order to
guarantee that real money is taxed at the same rate as
consumption goods, the nominal interest rate ought
to be equal to the production cost of real balances c,
int* = c.
If the production cost c is negligible, then the nom-
inal interest rate should be zero. Thus, also in this case,
money is optimally taxed at a positive proportionate
rate. However, the total price charged for money when
the cost of producing money is zero is still zero,
int*(1 + τ*) = 0.
Again in this case, the Friedman rule is optimal
because of the assumption of a negligible production
cost of money.
In the examples just described, liquidity was treat-
ed as a final good like any other consumption good.
In reality, liquidity is valued because it reduces trans-
action costs. Modeling money as an input in the pro-
duction of transactions, rather than as an argument in
the utility function, has implications for the optimal
inflation tax when money is costly to produce. Under
the assumption that money is costly, if the transactions
technology is constant returns to scale, real balances
should not be taxed.2 Thus, the optimal tax rate on
real balances is
τ* = 0.
This is in the spirit of Diamond and Mirrlees’ (1971)
taxation rules, whereby it is not optimal to tax inter-
mediate goods when the technology is homogenous
of degree one. If instead, the degree of homogeneity
of the transactions technology is different from one,
as in the case of the transactions technology proposed
by Baumol (1952) and Tobin (1956), then it is opti-
mal to set a non-zero tax on the use of real balances,
0 * . < > τ
The optimal proportionate tax or subsidy does
not approach zero as the cost of producing money be-
comes arbitrarily small. However, in the limit, when
c = 0, the price of using money, that is, the nominal
interest rate marked up by the consumption tax,
int*(1 + τc), is zero,
int*(1 + τc) = c (1 + τ*) = 0.
The Friedman rule is optimal. Thus, in this envi-
ronment as well, it is the costless nature of money that
justifies not taxing real balances. I review these results
based on Correia and Teles (1996, 1999).
The analysis in this article compares, in welfare
terms, consumption taxes to the inflation tax and leaves
out income taxes. The reason for this is that, under rea-
sonable assumptions on the transactions technology,
consumption and income taxes are equivalent tax in-
struments, and so the result on the optimal inflation
tax is unchanged whether one or the other alternative
tax is considered. That is not the case when one uses
the standard specification of the transactions technol-
ogy, first proposed by Kimbrough (1986). Consequent-
ly, the issue of which alternative tax instrument one
considers has received some attention in the literature.
When the alternative tax is an income tax, the Friedman
rule is optimal, while when the alternative is a consump-
tion tax, the conditions for the optimality of the
Friedman rule are more restrictive. Mulligan and
Sala-i-Martin (1997) used this fact to argue for the
fragility of the Friedman rule. I review their claim,
which is assessed in De Fiore and Teles (2003).
The policy implications from the analysis in this
article should be taken with some caution, since the
analysis abstracts from the role of monetary policy as
stabilization policy, justified by the presence of nom-
inal rigidities that are assumed away in the analysis.
In models with those frictions, although there are sim-
ple structures where the Friedman rule is still optimal
(see Correia, Nicolini, and Teles, 2001), in more com-
plex staggered price-setting environments, the optimality
of the Friedman rule is lost. Nevertheless, the optimal
inflation rate is still a very low number. Another aspect
of monetary policy that this analysis abstracts from is
the issue of commitment. The assumption here is that
the policymaker can commit to future policy. If that is
not the case, the policy suggestions in this article will
not be of much use.31 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
A simple model of liquidity as a final good
The first model I consider is a simple money-in-
the-utility-function model. In such models, agents use
real balances because they provide utility directly. This
assumption is useful in the context of the analysis in
this article to assess the public finance argument, orig-
inally made by Phelps (1973), that liquidity should
be taxed like any other good.
The preferences of the households depend on con-
sumption, leisure (defined here as time not devoted
to the production of the consumption good), and real
balances. In a first version of the model, I define real
balances as the nominal balances deflated by the price
level net of consumption taxes. The goods are produced
with time and, for the sake of understanding the im-
plications of money being a costly good, there is also
a time cost of real balances.3 The government must fi-
nance exogenous expenditures with either consump-
tion taxes or the inflation tax. A positive inflation tax is
levied whenever the price charged for the use of money
is higher than the cost of producing it, that is, when the
nominal interest rate is higher than the time cost of pro-
ducing real balances. When that cost is zero and the in-
terest rate is also zero, the Friedman rule is followed.
When the cost is positive, a modified Friedman rule,
which takes into account that money is costly, sets the
nominal interest rate equal to the cost of real balances.
In this model the nominal interest rate creates a dis-
tortion between real balances and leisure when it differs
from the cost of producing real balances. A non-zero con-
sumption tax creates a distortion between consumption
and leisure. In this model where real balances are a final
good, a direct application of the Ramsey (1927) prin-
ciples of taxation would suggest that real balances ought
to be taxed like any other good. Indeed, under the con-
ditions on preferences established by Atkinson and
Stiglitz (1972), the two goods, consumption and money,
should be taxed at the same proportionate rate. Therefore,
under those conditions, the nominal interest rate should
be equal to the production cost of money marked up
by the proportionate tax levied on the consumption
goods. This means that even for a very small cost of
producing money, the modified Friedman rule is not
exactly optimal. It is approximately optimal, though.
The Friedman rule is optimal in the limit case where
the cost of supplying money is exactly zero. As the cost
of producing money approaches zero, the consumption
tax converges to a finite and strictly positive number,
and thus the optimal price charged for the use of money
converges to the production cost, that is, zero. In this
case, it is clear that the optimality of the Friedman rule
hinges on the assumption that money is costless. The
formal analysis of this problem is described in box 1.
Money is deflated by the price level gross
of consumption taxes
Above, I assumed that liquidity services were rep-
resented, as a final good, by the stock of nominal money
deflated by the price level net of taxes. However, if
consumption taxes are paid with money, the liquidity
services of money are more appropriately described
by the stock of money deflated by the price level gross
of consumption taxes. What are the implications of
considering this measure of real balances?
If liquidity services are measured by money de-
flated by the price level gross of consumption taxes,
money is implicitly taxed at the same rate as consump-
tion, and so the cost of using money is no longer the
nominal interest rate, but rather the interest rate marked
up by the consumption tax. The relative price of real
balances in units of time is it(1 + τct), while the relative
price of consumption in units of time is (1 + τct). Under
the conditions for uniform taxation of Atkinson and
Stiglitz (1972), the optimal nominal interest rate is
equal to the cost of supplying real balances,4
it = α.
Does this mean that the Friedman rule is optimal?
Not really. In this context, a modified Friedman rule
should take into account the implicit taxation of mon-
ey, resulting from the need to use money to pay tax-
es. The modified Friedman rule is such that the total
cost of using money equals the cost of supplying it,
it(1 + τct) = α.
Thus, in order for the modified Friedman rule to
hold, the nominal interest rate would have to include
a subsidy to money at the same rate as the consump-
tion tax that would compensate for the implicit taxa-
tion of real balances.
Under the conditions for uniform taxation, this pol-
icy is not optimal. However, as the cost of supplying
money approaches zero, the two policies coincide. The
optimal policy is the Friedman rule of a zero nominal
interest rate. Again, in this case the Friedman rule is
optimal because money has a zero cost of production.
The Ramsey problem in this environment is formal-
ized in box 2.
A monetary model with a transactions
technology
The money-in-the-utility-function models ana-
lyzed in the previous sections can be interpreted as
equivalent representations of models where money
reduces the transactions costs that households have32 2Q/2003, Economic Perspectives
BOX 1
The Ramsey problem in a money-in-the-utility-function model
In this model with money in the utility function,
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The technology to produce consumption uses time
only and is linear with a unitary coefficient.
The representative household chooses a sequence
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=  where Bt are nominal securities
that pay (1 + it)Bt units of money in period t + 1, that
satisfies the budget constraint and maximizes utility
in equation 1, given a sequence of prices,  0 {, } tt t Pi
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and initial nominal wealth W0 ≡  M–1 + (1 + i–1)B–1.
For simplicity, I assume that the initial wealth is zero,
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together with a no-Ponzi games condition. The vari-
able τct is the consumption tax rate.
The government finances an exogenous sequence
of government expenditures, {gt}, by setting tax rates
on the consumption good, {τct}, as well as the nomi-
nal interest rates, {it}. The resource constraints in
this economy are given by
3) 1 , 0,
v
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where α is the cost in units of time of supplying one
unit of real money. It is a standard assumption in the
literature that this cost is zero, α = 0.
The intertemporal budget constraint for con-
sumers can be written as
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1 subject to equation 4, I obtain the following mar-
ginal conditions:
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The marginal conditions 5–7, the budget con-
straint, 4 satisfied with equality, and the resource
constraints, 3, determine the set of feasible and
implementable allocations,  0 {, , } ,
v
tt t t chm
∞













 and taxes  0 {, }. ct t t i
∞
= τ  This
is the set of competitive equilibriums, such that the
government finances exogenous government expen-
ditures with consumption and inflation taxes. The
government solves a Ramsey problem, by choosing
in this set the path for the quantities, prices, and
taxes that maximizes welfare, thus minimizing the
excess burden of taxation.
The two intratemporal marginal conditions 5
and 6 and the resource constraint 3 determine the
quantities of consumption, leisure, and real balances
in each period t ≥ 0 as functions of the taxes.1 Once
0 {, , }
v
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= !  are determined as functions of the taxes
0 {, }, ct t t i
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= τ  I can use condition 7 to determine the path












of the taxes  0 {, }. ct t t i
∞
= τ  The paths of taxes must satisfy
the government’s budget constraint, which can be
obtained from the households’ budget constraint, 4
with equality, and the resource constraints. This strat-
egy of solving the system of competitive equilibrium
equations is the dual approach. Because the system
is linear in the taxes and prices, a primal approach is
more efficient, where the taxes and prices are ex-
pressed as functions of the quantities, and substitut-
ed in the households’ budget constraint.33 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
BOX 1 (CONTINUED)














 using conditions 5–7 into the budget
constraint, 4 satisfied with equality, and obtain the
implementability condition
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The Ramsey problem will then be simplified to
consist of the choice of the path of quantities,
0 {, , } ,
v
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= !  that satisfies the implementability
condition 8 and the resource constraint 3 and maxi-
mizes welfare. The taxes and prices that decentralize
the optimal solution can then be obtained from equa-
tions 5–7. The following are first order conditions:
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where ψ and βtλt are the multipliers of the implement-
ability constraint and the time t resource constraint,
respectively.
Suppose the utility function is additively sepa-
rable in leisure and homogeneous in consumption and
real balances,2 so that it can be written as
12) ( , , ) ( , ) ( ),
v Vcmh ucm vh =+ !!
where u is homogeneous of degree k. Then the first
order conditions of the Ramsey problem in equa-
tions 9 and 10 become
13) Vc(t)[1+ψ(1+k)] = λt
14) ( )[1 (1 )] . mt Vt k +ψ + =αλ !









! Thus, the optimal
policy will not distort the marginal choice between
consumption and real balances.3 The way to decen-
tralize this solution is to set the same proportionate
tax on consumption and money. Since, from equa-
tion 6, the relative price of m !  in





+τ  the optimal inter-
est rate is it = (1+τct)α, so that it imposes a tax on real
balances, at the same rate as the consumption tax.
In this context, where there is a cost of producing
real balances, it makes sense to consider a modified
Friedman rule that takes into account the production
cost of money and corresponds to a zero tax on money.
According to that modified rule, the nominal interest
rate should equal the cost of producing real balances,
it = α. The modified Friedman rule is not optimal.
This is true for any α > 0 since the tax rate on con-
sumption is bounded away from zero.
Consider a sequence of problems where the cost
of supplying real balances, α, approaches zero. Since
the optimal tax rate on consumption is bounded above,
as the cost of supplying real balances becomes arbi-
trarily low, the optimal interest rate approaches zero.
Thus, in the limit, the Friedman rule is optimal. In
this case, it is clear that the reason the Friedman rule
is optimal is the standard assumption of a zero cost
of producing real balances.
1If the taxes and the government expenditures are constant
over time, τct = τc, it = i, and gt = g, then the allocation will
be stationary. This steady state will be characterized by
1
1








so that inflation will be constant as well.
In this stationary economy, inflation will be equal to the
growth rate of money supply. In order for the nominal in-
terest rate to be equal to zero, so that the Friedman rule is
followed, it must be the case that the growth rate of mon-
ey supply is negative and equal to β – 1.
2The conditions for uniform taxation of Atkinson and Stiglitz
(1972) are separability of leisure and homotheticity in the
consumption goods.











corresponds to equal elasticity. In this case, where the
goods have the same price elasticity, the tax rates ought to
be the same.34 2Q/2003, Economic Perspectives
BOX 2
The Ramsey problem with real balances measured by money deflated by the price level gross of taxes
The utility function is
0












and the resource constraints are given by
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The representative household maximizes utility
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The marginal conditions are
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Proceeding as before, I obtain the implementability
condition
0
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The two Ramsey problems are identical once
t m !  is replaced for mt. Thus, when the utility func-
tion is additively separable in leisure and homoge-









As before, the optimal fiscal policy will not distort
the marginal choice between consumption and real
balances. However, in this case, since the relative
price of real balances in terms of consumption is it,
the optimal solution will be decentralized with
it = α,
so that the nominal interest rate does not include a
tax or a subsidy on money. Money is being taxed
implicitly at the same rate as consumption.
As the cost of supplying real balances becomes
arbitrarily low, the optimal interest rate approaches
zero. In the limit, the price charged for the use of
money is zero. The Friedman rule is optimal in that
limiting case.
to incur. That interpretation is the common justification
for the assumption that real balances are a final good.
In this section, I analyze a standard model with a trans-
actions technology, derive the equivalent money-in-the-
utility-function model, and show that the restrictions
imposed by the transactions technology structure would
have implications for the optimal inflation tax if money
was a costly good. In the models above, the optimal
policy imposed the same proportionate distortion be-
tween real balances and leisure as between consump-
tion and leisure; however, when money is modeled as
an input into a constant returns to scale transactions
technology, it is no longer optimal to distort the mar-
ginal choice between real balances and leisure, so that
a modified Friedman rule is optimal. The latter result
is an application of the optimal taxation rules of
Diamond and Mirrlees (1971), whereby intermediate
goods should not be taxed when consumption taxes are
available and the technology is constant returns to scale.
Since the monetary aggregate that facilitates transac-
tions is, by assumption, the stock of money deflated by the
price level gross of consumption taxes, real balances are
implicitly taxed at the consumption tax rate, so that the
relative price of money in terms of leisure is it(1 + τct).
The relative price of consumption is (1 + τct). When
the transactions technology is constant returns to scale,
the optimal policy is to set the price of money equal
to its cost,
it(1 + τct) = α,35 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
so that the optimal nominal interest rate includes a
subsidy at the consumption tax rate. A modified
Friedman rule, which takes into account both the cost
of producing real balances and the implicit tax on real
balances resulting from the need to use money to pay
the consumption taxes, is optimal.
The principle that when there are consumption taxes
it is not optimal to tax intermediate goods only holds if
the technology is constant returns to scale, and, therefore,
there are no implicit profits. Under the assumption that
money is costly, if the transactions technology is not con-
stant returns to scale, then the modified Friedman rule
will no longer be optimal. In this case there are posi-
tive or negative implicit profits, introducing a trade-off
between the lump-sum taxation of profits and the pro-
duction distortions. In order to reduce profits, it will be
optimal to either tax or subsidize money, depending
on the degree of homogeneity.
The optimal policy is
1
22) ,
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where ψ is the multiplier of the implementability con-
dition, equation 33 in box 3, measuring the excess burden
of taxes; λt is the multiplier of the resource constraint
at time t; Uh(t) is the marginal utility of leisure; and k
is the degree of homogeneity of the transactions technol-
ogy.5 Clearly, if the transactions technology is constant
returns to scale, so that k = 1, the modified Friedman
rule is optimal. If k > 1, money should be subsidized,
and if k < 1, money should be taxed. As α approach-
es zero, the Friedman rule is optimal for any value of
the degree of homogeneity of the transactions technol-
ogy. Thus, the modified Friedman rule is not generally
optimal; it is optimal only for a zero cost of producing
money.
Even if the two models, money in the utility func-
tion or transactions technology, give disparate results
on the optimal inflation tax when money is costly, the
limiting result, when the cost of producing money is
zero, is the same. The Friedman rule is optimal, inde-
pendent of the modeling assumption, because money
is costless to produce.
The result that in models with transactions tech-
nologies it is optimal not to tax costless money was first
obtained by Kimbrough (1986) and then extended by
Chari, Christiano, and Kehoe (1996) and Correia and
Teles (1996). The public finance exercise in these last
two papers was a comparison between the income and
inflation taxes. If instead the option is between the infla-
tion tax and a consumption tax, other issues arise con-
cerning the specification of the transactions technology.
I discuss these issues, addressed by De Fiore and Teles
(2003), in the next section.
The Ramsey problem in this section is formalized
and solved in box 3.
How do consumption taxes affect the
transactions technology?
In the previous section, I showed that, when the cost
of producing money is zero, the Friedman rule is op-
timal for transactions technologies of any degree. This
is the same result that Correia and Teles (1996) obtained
in comparing the inflation tax with an income tax. In
the set-up described above,6 the consumption and in-
come taxes are equivalent fiscal instruments. This means
that the allocations that can be implemented are the
same with any of the two taxes, so that the optimal in-
flation tax does not depend on which tax is considered.
This result is in contrast with recent literature, in par-
ticular Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin (1997), who argue
that the optimality of the Friedman rule is a fragile re-
sult because it depends on the alternative tax instrument.
In this section, I clarify this point, based on De Fiore
and Teles (2003).
Under the standard specification of the transactions
technology, as originally proposed by Kimbrough
(1986) and later used by Guidotti and Végh (1993) and
Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin (1997), among others, the
consumption and income taxes are, indeed, not equiv-
alent fiscal instruments. Moreover, when the alterna-
tive tax instrument is the consumption tax, the conditions
for the Friedman rule to be optimal are more restric-
tive. The reason for these contrasting results is that the
standard specification of the transactions technology
does not impose that money be unit elastic with respect
to the price level gross of consumption taxes, as I as-












The transactions technology specified by











If the function l is homogeneous, then it can be
written as36 2Q/2003, Economic Perspectives
BOX 3
The Ramsey problem in a transactions technology model
In a monetary model with a transactions technology,
the preferences of the representative household de-
pend only on consumption and leisure, where leisure
does not include the time used for transactions. They
are given by
0








where U is an increasing concave function, ct are con-
sumption goods, and ht is leisure at time t. The house-
holds supply labor 1 – ht – st, where st is time spent
in transactions.
Transactions are costly since they require time
that could otherwise be used for production. The amount
of time devoted to transactions increases with con-









+τ  where Pt is the price of the good be-













According to this transactions technology, money is
unit elastic with respect to the price level gross of con-
sumption taxes. In addition to standard assumptions
to ensure that the problem is concave, it is assumed
that the function l is homogeneous of degree k ≥ 0.
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The resource constraints are
26) ct + gt ≤ 1 – ht – l(ct, mt) – αmt.
This model can be written as an equivalent mon-
ey-in-the-utility-function model by defining 
v
t h  as the
total time used for leisure and transactions, .
v
tt t hhs ≡+
The model can thus be written in the form presented
in the last section. The preferences, the resource con-
straints, and the budget constraint are given by the
following expressions:
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From equation 27, it becomes clear that the assump-
tions above that the utility function is separable in
v
t h and homogeneous in consumption and real bal-
ances are not easily justifiable.
The private problem is defined by the maximi-
zation of condition 27, subject to condition 29. The
households’ problem must satisfy the following mar-
ginal conditions:
() () () ()
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Conditions 30–32, 29 with equality, and 28, deter-
mine the set of feasible and implementable allocations,
  0 {,, } , tt t t chm
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Using the fact that l(t) is homogeneous of degree
k, so that kst = lc(ct, mt) ct + lm (ct, mt)mt, the implement-
ability condition 21 in box 2 can be written as
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BOX 3 (CONTINUED)
The Ramsey problem is, therefore, the choice of quan-
tities,  0 {, , } ,
v
tt t t chm
∞
=  that maximize welfare, represent-
ed by the utility function (condition 27), and satisfy
the implementability condition 33 and the resource
constraints 28.
The first order conditions of this problem imply
the following condition,
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where ψ and βtλt are the multipliers of the imple-
mentability condition and the resource constraints,
respectively. Then, when k = 1, there is no distortion
imposed between real money and leisure. If k < 1,
money should be taxed, and if k > 1, money should
be subsidized.
Since real money is implicitly taxed, because
money is needed to pay taxes, the implementation of
this solution requires that money be subsidized.
Since the private problem has
()
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1As shown in Correia and Teles (1996), the term





 measures the marginal effect of real
balances on the implicit profits in the production of trans-
actions. By taxing or subsidizing real balances, the plan-
ner aims to reduce profits.
2If the transactions technology is Baumol–Tobin, so that
k = 0, then it is optimal to set a positive tax on money
balances.









This is the modified Friedman rule, in this context
where there is a cost of producing real balances and
they are implicitly taxed.
Whether the modified Friedman rule is optimal
or not, as α is made arbitrarily low the Friedman
rule is optimal. If k ≠ 1, there is a tax or a subsidy
that is, in absolute value, bounded above and away
from zero, as α becomes arbitrarily low.1,2 So in this
case too, it is the negligible cost of money that justi-
fies the zero tax on money.











where k is the degree of homogeneity. Notice that, un-
der this specification and not under equation 24, for
k > 0, it is possible to reduce time used for transactions
without adjusting the real quantity of transactions
measured in units of the consumption good, ct, and
without changing the real quantity of money











P +τ  are kept
constant, while setting τct = –1. As a result, transactions
will be zero, ct(1 + τct) = 0, and so time used for
transactions will also be zero.
Under the standard specification of the transac-
tions technology in equation 37, it may be optimal to
use the consumption tax to reduce the volume of
transactions and save on resources. In particular, when
both consumption and income taxes are allowed, it is
optimal, under certain conditions, to fully tax income
and subsidize consumption in order to eliminate trans-
action costs. When this is so, the government performs
the full volume of transactions on behalf of the private
agents. When the taxes on income are excluded, then
it may be optimal to set a positive inflation tax, so that
the consumption tax may be lower, and it may be pos-
sible to save on the volume and cost of transactions.
Box 4 describes the formal solution of the Ramsey
problem in this alternative environment.
Conclusion
From a Ramsey perspective on the optimum quan-
tity of money, the optimality of the Friedman rule owes
its robustness to the costless nature of money. In gen-
eral, if money was a costly good, a positive price should
be charged for its use, and this price in general should
be distorted. It is not clear whether this distortion should
involve subsidizing or taxing money, but still there
should in general be one. As the cost of producing
money becomes arbitrarily low, the proportionate
distortion is in absolute value bounded above and away
from zero. Thus, it is the costless nature of money
that justifies the optimality of the Friedman rule.38 2Q/2003, Economic Perspectives
1The nominal production costs of currency as a percentage of its
nominal value are approximately 0.12 percent. They are relatively
high for small denomination bills (2.18 percent for $1 bills) but
very low for higher denomination bills (less than 0.01 percent for
$100 bills). The cost of coins is 0.94 percent.
2The transactions technology uses real balances and time to pro-
duce transactions measured by consumption.
3I assume a constant cost per unit of real balances. One rationale
for this is the assumption that the production of real balances uses
bills of different real denominations in fixed proportions and with
constant returns, and that there is a constant time cost of producing
bills of each real denomination. The second assumption would be
more easily justified if the nominal denominations were indexed to
the price level at zero cost. In reality, this indexation is costly.
NOTES
4Notice that even if the measure of real balances is different,
I maintain the assumption of a constant time cost per unit of real
balances.
5The assumption that the transactions technology is homogenous
of degree k means that when real balances and consumption are
multiplied by λ, time used for transactions is multiplied by λk.
6The specification for the transactions technology in that section
is as in De Fiore and Teles (2003).
BOX 4
The Ramsey problem with the standard specification of the transactions technology
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The conditions of the private problem are the
same as described by conditions 17 and 18–20 in
box 2. The implementability condition and the re-
source constraint are also the same, respectively, as
conditions 21 and 16. It is useful to write the mar-
ginal conditions of the private problem, conditions
18 and 19, as
() () ( 1 ) ()
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From these we have,
41) –(1+τct)klm(t) = it(1+τct),  0 t≥ .
The implementability condition can be written as:
()
0
42) ( ) ( ) 1 (1 ) ( ) 0.
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The Ramsey problem is to maximize utility in
condition 38, subject to conditions 16 and 42 and to
the constraint that  (, , )
v
ct t t t chm τ= τ  is defined im-
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The marginal effect of real balances
on the consumption tax is
1
(1 ) ( )
44) .










∂  ++ τ 
The second term on the left-hand side of equation
43, 









 is the impact on transactions
time of a marginal increase in real balances through
the effect on expenditures. If, at the Friedman rule,
those effects are not zero, then the Friedman rule
will no longer be optimal. That term is zero when
either k = 0, l(t) = 0, or lcm(t) = 0. When it is not zero,
even when k = 1, it is not optimal to set the private
benefit of money equal to the production cost, so
that the result of zero taxation of intermediate goods
of Diamond and Mirrlees (1971) does not apply. The
reason is that, in this case, the technology is directly
affected by the tax instruments.39 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
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